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What we do
• Study effect of tax credit reforms on education and employment 
decisions over the lifecycle
• Using a lifecycle model of female labour supply, human capital and 
savings
– Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) and (1999), Keane and Wolpin (1997), Adda
et al (2008), Todd and Wolpin (2006), Eckstein and Lifshitz (2011)
• With parameters estimated using British panel data (BHPS)
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Standard approaches
• Features of traditional welfare evaluations (e.g. Brewer et al, 2006):
1. Estimate impact of reform packages
2. Use static framework
3. Focus on short-run labour supply response
• Counter-examples: Ham and Lalonde (1996), Todd and Wolpin
(2006), Haan and Prowse (2010), etc
• This paper: first attempt to study UK tax and benefit system in 
dynamic context
– Focus is on female response to UK tax credit reforms
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– Dynamic effects via education, experience, productivity and family 
composition
– Also investigate impact on education
Background to reforms: budget constraints
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Literature: employment impact of WFTC/EITC
• WFTC
– + 2-7ppt increase in employment rate for lone parents
– Smaller, possibly negative impact for second earners in couples
– Blundell et al (2005), Brewer et al (2006), Francesconi and van der
Klaauw (2004), Francesconi et al (2009)
• EITC
– Positive and substantial impact on employment rate for lone parents 
(e.g. Eissa and Liebman (1996), Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001))
– Modest negative impact for second earners (e.g. Eissa and Hoynes
(1998))
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Literature: impact of WFTC/EITC on other outcomes
• Couple formation and dissolution
– WFTC: mixed evidence (Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2004), Gregg 
et al (2007), Francesconi et al. (2009))
– EITC: small and ambiguous (Eissa and Hoynes (1999), Ellwood (2000))
• Childbearing
– WFTC: Fall in fertility for lone parents, rise for couples (Francesconi and 
van der Klaauw, (2004), Brewer et al (2008))
– EITC: little effect (Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2009))
• Anticipation and labour market attachment effects?
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Model: overview of female lifecycle
Life in three stages:
1. Education (up to 18/21)
− Secondary, A-levels or university (determines type of human capital)
2. Working life (18/21-59)
− Labour supply {0hrs, 20hrs, 40hrs} and consumption
− Partnering and childbearing
3. Retirement (60-69)
− Consumption only
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Model: dynamics of female earnings
• Log wage equation
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Model: dynamics of family income
• (Exogenous) family formation dynamics
– Children
• Model youngest child
• Characterised by age
• Arrival probability depends on family characteristics
• Departure with certainty when child reaches age 18
– Partners
• Characterised by education, employment status and wage
• Arrival and departure probabilities depend on family characteristics
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Model: dynamics of family income
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– Taxes: income tax, NI, council tax
– Benefits: child benefit, maternity grant, tax credits, income support, housing 
benefit, council tax benefit, free school meals
Model: decision-making environment
• Risk averse individuals faced with uncertainty
– Own productivity (health)
– Family dynamics: partnering/separation, child bearing
– Partner employment and income
• No insurance market
– Only implicit insurance through human capital, savings and public policy
• Credit constraints during working life
– So public policy may facilitate transfers across lifecycle
• Decisions taken to maximise expected lifetime utility
























Model: data and estimation
• Model estimated using BHPS data:
– Unbalanced panel of 5,300 females  over 16 waves, 1991–2006
• Multi-step estimation procedure
1. Fix interest rate, discount rate, intertemporal preference parameter
2. Estimate some parameters outside structural model
• Male selection model
• Family dynamics and childcare costs (reduced form)
3. Estimate remaining parameters by method of simulated moments (MSM)
• Parameters include: cost of education, female wage equation, experience accumulation, 
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taste for employment, distribution of unobserved heterogeneity
• Results below based on data simulated by the model
Model fit: female log hourly wage
2
.4








20 30 40 50
lpoly smoothing grid
s=1, data s=1, sim
s=2, data s=2, sim
s=3, data s=3, sim
Model fit: female employment rate
1






20 30 40 50
lpoly smoothing grid
s=1, data s=1, sim
s=2, data s=2, sim
s=3, data s=3, sim
Model fit: female employment rate by age of child
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Non-revenue neutral effect (ppt/100):
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Revenue neutral effect (ppt/100):
1999+WFTC 0.014 -0.002 0.103 0.000 -0.043 +0.014
2002 0.002 0.002 0.046 0.001 -0.039 +0.039
2004 0.005 0.021 0.029 -0.003 -0.027 +0.029
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Note: “Tax adjust” = change in basic rate of income  tax
Education effect of reforms
Basic Intermediate Higher
1999 baseline 0.318 0.472 0.209
Revenue neutral effect (ppt/100):
1999+WFTC 0.014 -0.003 -0.011
2002 0.023 -0.005 -0.017
2004 0.034 -0.009 -0.025
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Revenue neutral effect, no education response (ppt/100):
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Note: “Tax adjustment” = change in basic rate of income  tax












Revenue neutral effect, no education response (ppt/100):
1999+WFTC 0.014 -0.002 0.103 0.000 -0.043 +0.014
2002 0.002 0.002 0.046 0.001 -0.039 +0.039
2004 0.005 0.021 0.029 -0.003 -0.027 +0.029
Revenue neutral effect, with education response (ppt/100):
1999+WFTC 0.005 -0.006 0.080 -0.002 -0.051 +0.021
2002 -0.010 -0.006 0.014 -0.001 -0.048 +0.050
2004 -0.012 0.012 -0.017 -0.006 -0.037 +0.045
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Note: “Tax adjustment” = change in basic rate of income  tax
Conclusion
• Develop a female lifecycle model to study UK tax and benefit system 
in dynamic context
– Dynamics via education choices, experience accumulation, productivity 
and family composition
• Estimated on UK data
• Used to understand effect of UK tax credit reforms
• Results suggest:
– Lifecycle employment effects (holding education fixed):
• Large for lone mothers and mothers in couples
• Marginally positive overall
– But education choices sensitive to reforms
– Lifecycle employment effects (allowing education response):
• Effects fall substantially 
• Overall effect now negative
